United States: No diplomacy with Iran?
22 May, 2006
By Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
The letter from the President of Iran Mahmood Ahmadi-Najad to US President George W Bush offers an unexpected opportunity for a fresh diplomatic relationship between the two countries. It was the first letter from an Iranian head of state to his American counterpart since Washington broke off relations after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In his long letter, while critically examining the moral, political and economic policies of the United States, the Iranian President asked his American counterpart: "Is there no better way to interact with the rest of the world? He proposed "new ways" to resolve their differences.
The Bush administration censured the offer by saying that the letter contains no concrete diplomatic proposal and thereby it was a diversionary tactic that did not address the crucial problem of Tehran's nuclear ambitions. Therefore, instead of engaging the Iranians directly, it continues its previous policy. On May 10, 2006 Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice said American diplomats would wait a couple of weeks while the Europeans design an offer to the Iranians that would make clear that they have a choice that would allow them to have a civil nuclear program in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons technology. The Bush administration had shown by words and action that it wants no direct talks with Iran. Why the United States is reluctant to talk directly with Iran?
The United States interest in the Gulf and the Arab world makes sense about its inflexible stance for not allowing the Iranians to acquire nuclear enrichment technology for peaceful purposes. In the aftermath of 1991 Gulf War, the United States established its overwhelming dominance in the Middle East. Since then, its foreign and strategic policies have been maintaining its strategic, political and economic dominance in the Persian Gulf and Arab World without a challenge from any regional player. Precisely, the United States is in a privileged position and therefore, status quo is in its advantage. Any development, which alters the present situation in the region, is not acceptable for the United States. Talking directly with the Iranian leadership imply that Bush Administration recognizes Ahmadi-Najad government as a de-jure regime.
The United States rigidity could be understood by three factors-lack of trust between the Washington and Tehran, requirements for structural dominance and the United States military superiority. Though the Iranians do not make nuclear device with its present enrichment technology, yet there are chances that it would gradually enhance its scientific expertise and after a few years it would be qualified enough to make the nuclear device. The Washington is not ready to trust Tehran because the former believes that latter would deviate from its commitments. The Americans claim that Iranians had signed the agreement and accepted inspection but then allegedly cheated on its commitments.
The Americans and its Western allies are convinced that once Iranians developed nuclear weapon, it would be difficult to reverse their nuclear weapons program. Importantly, over the years, the United States and other nuclear powers have come to the conclusion that the spread of nuclear weapons to smaller states would undermine their structural dominance, as nuclear weapons, under certain conditions, would serve as a great equalizer. The development of nuclear weapons by a conventionally inferior power would limit the ability of conventionally superior powers from intervening in the former internal affairs. One of the key attributes of a major power is its ability to punish a weaker actor militarily without receiving punishment in kind in return. Nuclear possession by a weaker actor can put significant constraints on the major power's ability to intervene and punish because it establishes the balance of terror among the belligerent nuclear capable states.
The offer by the Iranian president failed in engaging his American counterpart because of an obvious military asymmetry between Iran and the United States. The United States is militarily very strong power-sole super power. Whereas, Iran is not even qualified to be considered a medium power. The contemporary international politics manifest that there is no comparison between a state, which is armed and one, which is not. It is unreasonable to expect that a militarily strong state would obey one, which is not strategic equalizer or that militarily weak state would remain safe and secure when its adversary possess sophisticated arms. No doubt, with surgical military strikes the United States would destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure. With military operation, if successful, it would only set back the Iranian nuclear program for a few years. At the
same time the military operation would have serious political, diplomatic and economic repercussions. It would kill masses of civilians, further inflame the entire Muslim world, throw the international oil market into turmoil, and probably solidify popular support behind the extremists in the Muslim world.
The majority in the international community desires flexibility in the United States approach towards Iran. They believe that economic sanctions and military operation against Iran would further deteriorate the situation. On May 11, 2006 the head of Russia's Security Council Igor Ivanov warned that any military action in Iran would lead to consequences that could seriously explode the situation in the region and beyond. Therefore, the diplomacy is a wise option to resolve the crisis, whether the Bush administration likes it or not.
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