Indo-US Nuclear Deal
03 January, 2006
By Zafar Nawaz Jaspal
The Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran visited Washington on December 21-22, 2005. The primary objective of the visit was to expedite the implementation of agreements and understandings contained in the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement issued following the discussions held between the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush. The Indians earnest desire is to implement Indo-US Civil Nuclear deal. In July, President Bush agreed to assist India with the development of nuclear energy, but the United States Congress is insisting that India demonstrate there should be complete separation between energy and military activities because India is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Richard Lugar, chairman of the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated, "I would urge the Indian side to think in maximalist terms and include as many facilities as possible within the scope of the civilian declaration."
During Mr. Saran visit, the Bush Administration’s high ups gave impression that without the prior settlement of the issue regarding the separation of nuclear facilities, i.e. division between civilian and military facilities, the civil nuclear energy cooperation between India and United States would not be feasible. The Bush Administration desires to cooperate with India in the nuclear field, but it could not ignore opposition of the anti-nuclear proliferation lobby within or outside the United States. Simultaneously it`s obvious that it believes that militarily and economically strong India would serve their strategic pursuits in Asia in the future. Especially, it could balance China, which is assumed by the majority of American strategists as a future strategic competitor. Though the Chinese and Americans have developed strong economic ties in the recent years, yet they have divergent views over the future of Taiwan. Precisely, both states disagree on number of political and strategic issues. Therefore, the Washington is assisting New Delhi to achieve a status of global power in the current international politics. Therefore, the American’s chalked out a new framework for assisting Indians in high technology, including defense, space exploration, satellite navigation, and full civilian nuclear energy cooperation.
The July 2005 summit between the US President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in Washington provided a roadmap for the transformation of bilateral strategic ties. On October 17, 2005 the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India`s Minister of State for Science and Technology Kapil Sibal, signed an umbrella science and technology agreement to boost cooperation in areas ranging from health to space technology. The purpose of the agreement was to strengthen the science and technology capabilities of the United States and India, to expand relations between the extensive scientific and technological communities of both countries, and to promote technological and scientific cooperation in areas of mutual benefit. Prior to it, in June 2004, the United States licensed Boeing`s satellite systems to the Indian Space Research Organization to build a communication satellite.
On July 18, 2005 Bush Administration announced civil nuclear cooperation with India. In simple terms it agreed to lift a ban on civilian nuclear technology sales to nuclear-armed India, despite its refusal to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty or give up its nuclear arms. This cooperation would effectively grant India highly sought-after access to sensitive nuclear technology only accorded to states in full compliance with global nonproliferation standards. It would also treat India in much the same way as the five original nuclear-weapon states by exempting it from meaningful international nuclear inspections. It is a virtual endorsement of India’s nuclear weapons status. To be precise, this would enable India to obtain enriched uranium to fuel its nuclear reactors; acquire nuclear reactors from the international market; and participate in international nuclear research and development. Importantly, the implementation of the civil nuclear energy cooperation deal requires Congress to adjust United States laws and policies. According to the reports the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicated that it would judge the efficacy of the Indian separation plan in terms of three criteria` compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards, non-assistance to India`s nuclear weapons program, and transparency.
Under the Bush-Manmohan pact, India agreed to separate its civilian and military facilities in return for full civilian nuclear energy cooperation from the United States. In this context, instead of "perpetual" safeguards arrangements between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that will signal finality to civilian separation, New Delhi is interested in concluding a ``voluntary`` safeguards arrangement with the IAEA that could allow Delhi to pull nuclear facilities out of the civilian list in the future and put them back to military use. Whereas, the Congress desired that the separation plan must ensure, and the safeguards must confirm, that Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation does not in any way assist India in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Whether the perpetual safeguards arrangement would be able to prevent the Indians from using nuclear material from the declared civilian nuclear facilities for the military usage? It`s a debatable question. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee criterion contains many loopholes. It is not an alternative to comprehensive safeguards.
Moreover, the India’s past record reveals that it would violate the agreement. For example, the 40-megawatt Canadian supplied Cirus reactor located North of Mumbai was proof of an apparent diversion. Hence, it would be difficult to resolve the issues such as Cirus, which was intended for peaceful use, but was diverted for military purposes.
The Indo-US nuclear deal would have serious ramifications for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and South Asian security. Democratic Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts argued, "The administration`s move to launch nuclear cooperation with India has grave security implications for South Asia and the entire world." This deal would assist India in increasing its nuclear weapons. It would acquire nuclear fuel from the United States for civilian use, thus freeing up its
own stocks for more weapons. End.
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